China exported 20 tonnes of unwrought antimony in September 2026, its first shipment of the metal this year after eight months at zero. The shipment comes a month before 27 November, when Beijing's suspension of its near-ban on antimony sales to the United States expires on its text.

The metal went to South Korea, oxide to buyers led by Russia, and trisulfide only to Vietnam. None of it has gone to the United States, ahead of a 27 November deadline that a September trade agreement may or may not cover.

The shipment is small against what China used to sell. Its unwrought antimony exports were worth $71.9m in 2024, the year licensing began, and $13.2m in 2025. South Korea was among the last regular buyers, taking shipments in seven months of 2025, including about $1.8m in each of November and December, before the flow stopped in January.

In 2022 the Netherlands and the United States were China's two largest buyers of the metal. In 2025 neither took any:

Destination

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026, Jan to Sep

Netherlands

3,600

2,500

811

nil

nil

United States

2,100

314

381

nil

nil

Japan

2,000

1,500

812

100

nil

South Korea

946

418

620

220

20

Belgium

799

51

329

25

nil

Thailand

2

nil

nil

62

nil

All destinations

11,000

5,300

3,900

407

20

China's exports of unwrought antimony and powders, by destination, in tonnes. Source: ITC Trade Map, China customs data (HS 811010); 2026 from the China Data Portal. Figures of 1,000 tonnes or more are rounded by the source.

Metal was the only form to dry up completely. Antimony oxide, the flame-retardant synergist and the largest antimony market by volume, left China every month, though at a few hundred tonnes rather than the several thousand a month shipped before export controls. Exports in the first nine months of 2026 were worth $74.2m, 38 per cent less than in the same months of 2025, and the trend within the year is down, from 1,305 tonnes in the first quarter to 1,047 in the second and 612 in the third. The buyers have changed too. China's largest customers before the controls, led by the United States, now receive none. Russia is the largest remaining buyer: its purchases more than quadrupled in the first nine months of 2026, to $27.3m, over a third of the total.

Destination

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026, Jan to Jun

United States

15,000

12,000

9,400

nil

nil

India

4,600

4,400

3,400

nil

nil

South Korea

3,000

3,300

2,500

148

122

Japan

3,100

2,800

2,200

80

nil

Belgium

439

750

869

nil

nil

Thailand

911

839

1,000

868

269

Vietnam

243

293

716

769

145

Mexico

774

306

908

722

210

Canada

940

1,100

600

668

100

Russia

1,400

1,500

935

655

856

All destinations

40,000

36,000

30,000

5,898

2,300

China's exports of antimony oxides, by destination, in tonnes; 2026 covers January to June. Source: ITC Trade Map, China customs data (HS 282580). Figures of 1,000 tonnes or more are rounded by the source.

Antimony trisulfide, the compound used in ammunition primers, has moved in a way it had not in five years. China records the compound under its own customs code, which shows almost no exports from 2021 until late 2025. Then came 3.1 tonnes in December 2025 and five tonnes each in June and August 2026, with none in September. Every shipment went to Vietnam. Nothing under the code has gone to the United States since a token shipment in mid-2024. The code also covers antimony sulfide concentrate, so the figures show the compound leaving China, not whether any of it was primer grade.

Exporting compounds and keeping metal for the domestic market has been the pattern of 2026. SMM says that pattern holds if September proves a one-off.

Licensing covers all three forms, but not in the same way. Under Announcement 2024 No. 33 of 15 August 2024, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs require a licence for antimony metal and trisulfide at any purity, and for oxides only at 99.99 per cent or above. Standard flame-retardant oxide sits below that threshold. SMM nonetheless links oxide volumes to the pace of licensing, a mechanism that has not been confirmed. A customs code also records the product, not the buyer. A tonne under 81101010 could be heading for an oxide converter or an alloy maker, and the customs record cannot tell them apart.

Two rules apply specifically to the United States, both from Announcement 2024 No. 46 of 3 December 2024. Article 1 prohibits exports of dual-use items to US military end users or for military end use. It names no material, so it catches antimony by operation rather than by name. It has never been suspended and has no expiry date. A tonne of trisulfide bound for a US military ammunition plant has therefore been prohibited throughout, whatever the monthly figures show. Article 2 says that licences for antimony, gallium, germanium and super-hard materials bound for the United States will in principle not be granted. Announcement 2025 No. 72, issued on 9 November 2025, suspended Article 2 until 27 November 2026. Since then, civilian US buyers have faced ordinary licensing rather than a presumption of refusal. The exception is 10 US companies that the ministry described as military-linked and, under Announcement 2026 No. 23 of 22 June 2026, barred from receiving any dual-use items; they include MP Materials and USA Rare Earth. Even so, Chinese customs has recorded no antimony oxide, metal or trisulfide going to the United States since the suspension.

On its text, that presumption returns on 28 November. On 28 September, however, the ministry's Department of American and Oceanian Affairs said China and the United States had agreed to extend their Kuala Lumpur arrangement to 10 January 2027. That arrangement had suspended certain tariff and non-tariff measures on each side until 10 November 2026. The statement does not mention export controls, Announcement No. 72 or 27 November. No. 72 still reads 27 November, and the ministry's list of announcements, which runs to No. 52 of 19 October, contains nothing amending it. Neither government has said whether the political extension reaches it. If the suspension brought no recorded shipments to the United States, its lapse may change little in practice; what it would change is the legal default, from ordinary licensing back to refusal in principle. None of this explains the drop in shipments to Europe. Beijing's European measures, dual-use bans on seven European entities in April 2026 and 14 more in July, after the EU sanctioned Chinese firms, name individual companies and came long after China's oxide shipments to Belgium and the Netherlands and its metal shipments to the Netherlands had stopped.

Enforcement has tightened around the shipment. Announcement 2026 No. 26 set up a public channel for reporting violations of strategic-mineral export controls, in force from 1 July. Announcement 2026 No. 52, issued with Customs on 19 October, means that where an exporter presents no licence and customs suspects the goods are controlled, the goods are held while customs and the ministry decide. September's metal left China between those two measures.

The cautious reading is the likelier one. Twenty tonnes is small enough to be a single licence for a buyer China was supplying until December, and SMM treats continued ingot exports as an open question. The test is whether the metal keeps moving, and China's October customs figures, due around 20 November, will give the first answer.